Zimbabwe: Structural Adjustment, Destitution & Food Insecurity

Rupak Chattopadhyay

This article examines the persistence of hunger in food surplus Zimbabwe during the 1990s. It combines a discussion of the literature on hunger with an analysis of the Zimbabwean structural adjustment programme using the 'entitlements' theory of famine as the point of departure to examine 'persistent starvation'. The article questions the extent to which the structural adjustment programme and increased food production have contributed to food security and welfare. It notes that destitution resulting from structural adjustment policies have increased food insecurity by eroding the purchasing power of large sections of the population. The article further argues that in addition to economic causes, destitution is exacerbated by the effective lack of accountability on the part of the key decision-makers.

Introduction

Harare was rocked by violent food riots for three days in January 1998 (The Economist, 1998). Until then Harare was considered one of Africa's most tranquil capitals and Zimbabwe thought to be one of the success stories of African agriculture. Except for the drought of 1991-1992, Zimbabwe has been largely self-sufficient in the production of staples. Furthermore, during the drought the government was able to prevent a potentially disastrous famine. Not only was the expansion in Zimbabwean agriculture meant to provide national food security, but until South Africa's admission to the group, Zimbabwe served as the Southern African Development Community (SADC's) granary. SADC's agricultural policies have been successful enough to turn the region into one of food surplus (Haarlov, 1997). So what explains discontent and destitution in the midst of food surpluses? Zimbabwe appears to be suffering from a food security paradox (Salih, 1994) food surpluses (supply factors) are insufficient to ensure food security. Demand driven factors are equally important. While recognising Zimbabwe's achievements in agriculture, this article seeks to analyse why Zimbabwe's structural adjustment programme has rendered food security such an elusive goal for so many Zimbabweans.

The Framework for Analysis

The analysis of starvation in policy circles is centred largely on Malthusian or neo-Malthusian approaches. These postulate that starvation results from a decline in aggregate food availability. The key flaw in this approach is the view that as long as food output grows as fast as population, starvation will not be a problem. Yet the Zimbabwean case demonstrates this premise to be problematic. The difficulty is the assumption that improvements in the supply of food are met automatically by
increases in food consumption per capita. The Malthusian approach merely highlights one of many symptoms associated with the onset of famines, it says little about the causal mechanism and cannot explain the occurrence of famine or starvation in the absence of food shortages. It may be uncontroversial that famine and starvation occur when there is a general contraction in food output but Malthusian mathematics is unable to explain why starvation should exist in the midst of plenty (Devereux, 1993; de Waal, 1989; Sen, 1982).

A more plausible explanation for the Zimbabwean situation may be constructed using an entitlements framework (Sen, 1981). The ‘entitlements’ approach gives us a number of useful concepts with which to diagnose and analyze starvation. It is the relationship between food and entitlements which is a key to the analysis of starvation: a person is reduced to starvation if a change in his/her endowment (for example, alienation of land, or loss of labour power due to ill health) or her/his exchange entitlement mapping (such as a fall in wages, rise in food prices, drop in the price of goods he buys and sells), makes it impossible to acquire a commodity bundle with enough food. As Devereux (1993) notes for self provisioning farmers the two types of failure are often linked. The entitlements approach treats starvation as the inevitable outcome of a collapse in effective demand for food. Proponents of the entitlements approach have successfully pointed out, that generalisations drawn from aggregate variables such as food availability per capita imply nothing about the distribution of food. The corollary of this observation is that hunger is rarely shared equally among all elements of a population. Thus in order to understand the dynamics of starvation in Zimbabwe we need to look closely at economic conditions and their effects on the real demand for food staples across society.

Starvation occurs in many forms and with differing consequences (de Waal, 1989). Famine and endemic hunger are but two of the most common facets of starvation. For Sen (1981) in what has become a well known observation: ‘Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the former it is but one of many possible causes’. Sen moreover, advances a definition of famine as a process:

In analyzing starvation in general, it is important to make a clear distinction between three different issues. (1) lowness of the typical level of food consumption; (2) declining trend of food consumption; and (3) sudden collapse of the level of food consumption. Famine is chiefly a problem of the third kind.

The emphasis on the ‘sudden collapse’ of food intake enables a distinction between famine and endemic hunger. Even critics of Sen’s characterisation of famine as a situation of starvation induced mass death (de Waal, 1989), concede the existence of a qualitative distinction between starvation of many kinds. An ‘entitlements’ based analytical framework has wide applicability because it does not specify a singular causal mechanism, but instead focuses on the key feature of famine, that is, a rapid fall in food intake over a period of time. Sen’s approach also allows us to identify two features associated with endemic hunger; namely ‘lowness’ of food consumption and a declining trend in that consumption. Food security is not achieved unless both declining trends (endemic hunger) and fluctuations in food intake are arrested. Tackling these two issues may require different policies. I will now explain why Zimbabwe has been successful in overcoming the problem of famine but not endemic hunger.
Preventing Famine

SADC’s first food security goal was to remove impediments to production. A regional early warning unit (REWU) was established with FAO support in order to get advance assessments of expected harvests. REWU carries out regular assessments and can trace yields while crops are still in the field. That data facilitates produce marketing and planning for food security. The region’s lack of any early warning system or database on weather and drainage patterns until 1986 was a serious handicap to its food security goals. Zimbabwean agriculture was a major beneficiary from SADC food security projects.

In 1981 the Southern African Center for the Coordination of Agricultural Research (SACCAR) was established. SACCAR allowed member countries to pool resources in order to develop high yield seed varieties of food staples that are well suited to regional agro-climatic conditions. Under Zimbabwean guidance, consultative technical committees (CTC) were set up to assess regional food security (Mhone, 1993). These committees brought together regional and international experts to offer technical advice on marketing, credit and land tenure. By removing technological and financial obstacles to production, SADC’s policies allowed the region to become largely self sufficient in grain by the early 1990s. Individual countries nevertheless continued to struggle with national self-sufficiency in food production. By 1986 Zimbabwe had almost two million tons of surplus grain (about three years equivalent of domestic sales), and a further four years supply of sorghum was held in storage (Thompson, 1991, 1993). The government invested heavily in storage facilities to maintain strategic reserves that could be put to use during food shortage emergencies.

The success of these agricultural and transport policies were put to the test by the drought that struck the region between 1992-1993. Although the drought of 1992-1993 affected over 20 million people in the region, famine was largely averted in Zimbabwe. The only regional famine related fatalities were reported in the Angolan and Mozambican war zones (Marcus, 1993). Zimbabwe’s agricultural surpluses provided the basis around which a drought relief plan was put in place. The Food Security and Technical Unit (FSTAU) of SADC was fully aware that Zimbabwe alone could not sustain the entire region during drought. Zimbabwean surpluses allowed the targeting of any regional entitlements protection programme: those deemed most at risk would have their entitlements protected prior to the arrival of external assistance (Salih, 1994). An example of this policy in action was seen in November 1992. Malawi at that time was deemed as being most at risk from famine. Zambia loaned Malawi some of its stored maize and additional trains were made available by Mozambique to carry food into Malawi (Meldrum, 1993; Thompson, 1993).

Preventing millions of deaths during the famine seemed to vindicate the production (supply) based approach to food security. By generating surpluses the region was able to meet a severe short term crisis. The extent of the crisis deemed it acceptable for Zimbabwe and other countries in the region to forgo market based allocation of food. Even when facing IMF-World Bank sponsored readjustment programmes, the prospect of high mortality rates was unacceptable, and these programmes were put on hold. While the Zimbabwe government acted quickly, for the relief system to work it only had to achieve a minimal standard. The purpose of re-distribution during the drought was simply to keep people from dying in large numbers (Maxwell, 1994). Furthermore, the drought caused a supply induced problem, and the manner in which it was handled does not explain why people continued to starve in normal agro-climatic conditions during the 1994-1998 period.
Structural Adjustment

In 1990 Zimbabwe introduced its five year Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Zimbabwe had entered the decade of the 1990s with a large fiscal imbalance and declining tax revenues caused by declining commodity prices. This was accompanied by virtual stagnation of the economy and record levels of unemployment (IMF, 1997; Sithole, 1996). Although billed as a home-grown adjustment programme, ESAP needed IMF support for access to US$ 3.5 billion in foreign exchange for its implementation (EIU, 1998). The first phase of ESAP began in October 1990 with the introduction of trade liberalisation which scrapped quantitative import controls. US$700 million pledged for the first phase did not become available until March 1992. By then Zimbabwe was reeling from a massive balance of payments crisis exacerbated by drought. As a result Zimbabwe had to make further concessions by agreeing to more stringent IMF conditionalities.

ESAP required the government to scale back its expenditure by imposing wage restraints, reducing subsidies and cutting social spending. The government was also encouraged to free trade restrictions and devalue the currency. ESAP called for a more vigorous export programme and despite claims and hopes to the contrary, the negative impact of the programme has been more than transitory. An IMF study (1995) across a number of countries admitted that stabilisation programmes were not working as well as they had hoped, and that their impact on gender inequality had been particularly disastrous (Kanjji & Jazdowska, 1993). Zimbabwe has not been exempt from the negative impact that the mindless application of the ESAP has had.

ESAP led to the increase in the prices of food and other basic commodities. Cuts in government subsidies led to sharp increases in the cost of living and health and education provision (Kanjji & Jazdowska, 1993; IMF, 1999). Currency devaluation assisted the movement of Zimbabwe from a middle income to a low income country almost immediately after the implementation of the economic reforms. (Zimbabwe Press Mirror, 1992; Wetherell, 1998). The hardships caused by economic restructuring were compounded by a culture of political patronage, where populist measures were implemented at the cost of meaningful reforms. One such decision, that of buying off the challenge to the government from war veterans has been particularly costly and unpopular. Thousands of war veterans were granted lump sum payments of Z$50,000 plus a Z$2,000 a month pension (Bond, 1998). In the spring of 2000 violent clashes erupted between veterans and white farmers over access to farmland.

Public expenditure had been the driving force behind Zimbabwe’s strategy of ‘growth with equity’ but ESAP called into question the country’s welfare state provision. The adjustment programme had been intended to boost government revenue but it achieved the exact opposite. According to the IMF between the fiscal year 1993 and 1997, Central government revenue fell by over 27 per cent in real terms (IMF, 1997, 1999). The main reason for this has been a shrinking tax base resulting from the growth of a large informal sector.

Changes in Healthcare

The first victim of a squeeze in public expenditure has been the health care system. Although in 1994/1995 health care spending amounted to 8.8 per cent of government expenditure, compared to 8.2 per cent in 1990/1991, the reduced size of government expenditure has meant a decline in real terms. Total real spending in 1994/95
amounted Z$386.7 million against a figure of Z$566.8 million for 1990/91 (EIU, 1998; IMF, 1997). The absolute size of the health care sector has continued to decline since the mid-1990s. It’s contribution to GDP declined by an average of 5.4 per cent each year between 1996 and 1998 (IMF, 1999). The effect of real falls in recurrent spending have been felt throughout the system, but preventive and outreach programmes appear to have been among the hardest hit. Real earnings for health workers declined by nearly 30 per cent between 1991 and 1995. Some of this loss was recovered in wage increases in 1997. Although health workers were protected from retrenchments, reductions in Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MOHCW) administration and maintenance staff reduced efficiency and may have added to a range of other difficulties. Declining life expectancy and increased maternal deaths are symptomatic of the reduced quality of general health care. Life expectancy peaked at 61 years in 1990 fell to 52 years in 1997 and 51 in 1998 (EIU, 1998; World Bank, 2000). Similarly, maternal deaths increased from 73 per 100,000 in 1987 to 144 per 100,000 in 1997 (World Bank, 1999).

Between 1990 and 1993 maternity fees in Harare were raised from Z$150 to Z$500 (Kanji & Jazdiwski, 1993; Renfrew, 1992). The biggest jump in costs came between December 1993 and March 1994, when the burden of comprehensive care jumped by a 164 per cent for the average family (IMF, 1997). The average wages in the urban areas at that time were about Z$300 a month placing the benefits accruing from maternity care outside the reach of a large number of people (Loewenson et al., 1991). Significantly, it is women who have most to loose from changes in the health care system, not just because of maternity associated issues but also because of general ailments arising from under-nourishment and overwork (Kanji & Jazdowska, 1993).

The cuts in health care could not have come at a worse time, especially in light of Zimbabwe’s AIDS crisis. It is estimated by the Ministry of Health that in 1996 some 300 people a week were dying from AIDS related causes (EIU, 1997).

The AIDS epidemic is particularly significant for food security because, the majority of those affected belong to the age group which is economically most active. Indeed it is estimated that by 2002-2004 life expectancy in Zimbabwe may fall to 21 years (World Bank, 1999). Skilled and unskilled workers who are often victims are unable to exchange their labour for income which consequently leads to the impoverishment of their families. Also as a consequence of a deterioration of child care facilities Zimbabwe’s infant mortality rate increased from 49 per 1,000 in 1990 to 73 per 1,000 in 1998 (UNDP, 1998; World Bank, 2000). Most infant mortality was attributable to ailments stemming from under-nourishment – which increased fourfold between 1998 and 1994 (World Bank, 1999). Nonetheless, it is has been the removal of subsidies on basic commodities that have hit the public hardest.

**Inflation**

Inflation has been the most persistent problem since ESAP was put in place. The downward spiral in the exchange rate (a 75 per cent decline during 1997 alone) has fueled inflation (Bond, 1998; IMF, 1999). The composite consumer price index (CPI) has risen by a factor of 4 between the start of ESAP in 1990 and December 1996. Between 1991 and 1996 the price of food more than trebled (IMF, 1997; EIU 1996). Within the first six months of ESAP the price of grain increased by 60 per cent (Kanji & Jazdiwski, 1993) In January 1998, the price of maize increased 21 per cent compared with two earlier price increases in the preceding year alone (The Economist, 1998). In
September 1998 the price of food and other basic commodities rose by another 40 per cent (Sunday Standard Online, 1998). This was followed by a 24 per cent rise in the period up to the January 1999 (IMF, 1999).

**Food on Every Table**

Food consumption among a number of occupational groups, such as landless labourers, have been declining since the late 1980s (Kanjii & Jazdiwska, 1993; EIU, 1998). It is estimated that since the late 1980s calorific intake among large sections of the regional population have declined by as much as 20 per cent (EIU, 1997). Two-thirds (63.3 per cent) of the population now live in absolute poverty, a large increase since independence (EIU, 1998; IMF, 1999). Yet these downturns in welfare have been taking place in the midst of record harvests. There were record harvests in 1997-1998 suggesting that the persistence of starvation was not a function of food production collapse. Instead there seems to be a break in the relationship between production and consumption. Production does not get translated into consumption either because of a faulty distributional mechanism or because of a lack of consumers with effective demand: both these issues are discussed in greater detail.

Problems with the distribution of food arise in two ways. In countries where the state has a central role in production and distribution, like many within SADC, it becomes the intermediary between producer and consumer. It is often the state which purchases agricultural output, that is then marketed through a state run grain marketing board. In the event that the state is unable to meet its financial obligations to the farmers, the harvest does not get brought in. Where public finances are in a perilous state as in much of sub-Saharan Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, the states’ ability to acquire the year’s harvest is subverted by other spending priorities or corruption (Thompson, 1991). In recent years that spending priority has focused on meeting debt obligations even at the cost of squeezing welfare at home: when the money exists for procurement, poor transportation links often make grain collection impossible (Mellor, 1994). So even when food is plentiful the mechanism for getting it to consumers is inadequate. In emergency situations, such as a natural calamity, it is easier for governments to disregard costs of transportation or procurement in order to get food to as much of the population as possible. However, to sustain such an effort over a longer period of time requires a fiscal capacity beyond that of the Zimbabwean government.

Grain marketing boards provide an important source of patronage for the ruling elite in many countries, Zimbabwe is no exception. (Haarlov, 1997; Uvin, 1994). Such boards are an important source of employment mainly to the urban elites, whose co-option is a prerequisite for the maintenance of political order (Marcus, 1993). Even where agricultural reforms have been introduced, this merely involved the freeing of producer prices. National governments have been reluctant to scale back the influence of grain marketing boards, despite paying lip service to such policy. Thus Bates’ (1981) thesis continues to remain valid. By attempting to control the market for grain, national governments have created marketing bottlenecks resulting in higher prices and inefficient distribution. Even in Zimbabwe, where higher producer prices have produced bumper harvests, the limited marketing capacity of the national grain marketing board have prevented the distribution of the grain, resulting in higher consumer prices and a loss in potential export revenue (EIU, 1998). In addition to being the major cause of marketing bottlenecks, these grain marketing boards are a drain on the exchequer because funds earmarked for the procurement of harvests are
often diverted for other things. Vested interests of national ruling elites preclude the establishment of an efficient regional distribution system.

Desperate times require desperate measures hence the non-market based response to alleviating starvation during the 1991-92 drought. However, in the longer term such solutions are not sustainable. Most countries, especially Zimbabwe, do not have the economic or fiscal ability to support a regular large scale distribution of free grain. As a practical alternative one must look to ‘market-based’ solutions as the foundation for food security. In this sense policy on food security cannot be divorced from economic policy making in general. By using the term ‘market based’ solution, I have tried to indicate that the state has an important role to play in ensuring food security. A free market solution would have, almost by definition, excluded the state from this realm.

For any market to work the consumers and suppliers need to reach a mutually acceptable price. The consumer’s ability to establish a command over a commodity is a function of his or her income, both monetary and/or non-monetary. In an ideal neoclassical economy the market clearing price is automatically reached such that all stocks of the commodity are sold. However, as Joan Robinson’s theory of imperfect markets and Mankiw and Romer (1991) suggest there are many intervening variables which prevent a market from clearing.

In the context of food security imperfect markets can be extremely problematic. As noted previously, southern Africa is a grain surplus region yet hunger seems endemic. The dynamics of such food insecurity are quite simple. The cornerstone of any market based approach must be the creation of a solid base of consumers. Food security for consumers is guaranteed when they have sufficient income (exchange entitlements) to purchase available grain, or have access to it as a result of owning the some of the produce (endowment entitlements) (Sen, 1981). There has been an erosion of these entitlements in Zimbabwe. Rhetoric notwithstanding, Zimbabwe has been unable to deliver ‘growth with equity’. Zimbabwe’s move from the ranks of middle income countries to low income countries is one example of such failure (IMF, 1995; 1999). That a greater proportion of the Zimbabwe’s population live in poverty in 1998 than at independence is also indicative of the failure of ‘growth with equity’, and the consequent erosion of entitlements. Indeed, price increase after price increase in the absence of matching growth in income also leads to a reduction in the number of consumers with effective demand.

There are three major sources of income in the Zimbabwean context; income derived from land, income derived from jobs in the private sector and income derived from employment by the state. The public sector in Zimbabwe has historically been a significant employer. However, given the precarious nature of public finances, many governments in the region have squeezed the incomes of their employees. Those most affected by this cut back in public expenditure are employees who are at the margins of the system. Healthcare and educational workers are examples of such groups and as I already noted expenditure in both these areas was slashed by ESAP.

The Zimbabwean government has continued to squeeze entitlements while squandering resources in supporting vested interests. In 1996, the parliament voted to give Mr. Mugabe, his Vice-President, their families (including the illegitimate children) pensions for life, the use of government transportation and public accommodation after their retirement (Zimbabwe Press Mirror, 1996). The government and the leaders have also spent millions on building new state residences in the midst of a public spending squeeze (EIU, 1996, 1997). In early 1998 Mr. Mugabe in Zimbabwe imposed
a 5 per cent surcharge (later repealed) on Zimbabweans to finance a populist move, paying huge sums of money to the powerful war veterans lobby. Coupled together with the arrest and intimidation of critics of government policy, it is unsurprising that Harare was rocked by violent food riots in January 1998. The continuing political unrest in Zimbabwe feeds off a general dissatisfaction with the country’s economic performance during the 1990s. That a threatened Mr. Mugabe continues to subvert the last vestiges of Zimbabwean democracy further aggravates domestic political, and economic crises.

Eighty per cent of Zimbabwe’s agricultural production comes from 4,500 commercial farms (EIU, 1998). These producers have access to the most fertile lands. While economically efficient, this reliance on commercial farming deprives peasant farmer livelihoods. The unviability of peasant farming is a major cause for rural unemployment within SADC. While the commercial farms do provide a source of employment to some, for the vast majority it is not an option. Also seasonal labourers who work in the countryside are poorly paid and lack job security. So they remain very vulnerable to fluctuation in the price of food and agro-climatic conditions. The rationale behind supporting peasant farmers is that it endows a large section of the regional population with a means of sustenance in the midst of market failures. At independence many of the SADC governments promised to radically alter property relationships within the region. Most commercial farms were run by settler populations prior to independence and international pressures have played a major role in maintaining the status quo. (Thompson, 1993) Even where there was appropriation of land by the state, its redistribution was carried out benefiting the least needy. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government allocated almost all its appropriated land to senior party officials and ministers (EIU, 1997).

Under intense political pressure through much of 1999, Mugabe resorted to populist measures on the question of land re-distribution. In the spring of 2000, thousands of communal farmers and war-veterans were encouraged to squat on prime farmland owned by the commercial farms. The need for land re-distribution notwithstanding, the resort to populism is no substitute for serious effective policy making (The Herald, 2000). Government approved legislation in April 2000 to seize land from the commercial farmers without compensation encouraged land seizures. Based on dubious legal grounds, such moves have serious implications for the country’s future food security. Zimbabwean agricultural success is largely built on the output from these commercial farms. To re-distribute their land holdings, without the corresponding extension of technical and financial support to their future peasant owners, threatens to undermine Zimbabwean agriculture. Furthermore, by encouraging its supporters to resort to extra-constitutional means, ZANU’s actions may also undermine confidence (and therefore future investments) in both agriculture and the economy, thereby worsening what is already a very bad situation.

The failure of entitlements is therefore occurring at two levels, one economic and another political. The two are not unrelated. The unaccountability of the regime is undoubtedly responsible for its indifference to the hardships faced by a large section of the population in light of the ESAP programme. The government’s response to criticism has been coercive in nature. In addition to intimidating the opposition, the government has reacted harshly to critics within the ZANU-PF party. It instituted disciplinary action against Mavhaire Dzikani, senior MP from Masvuryo and Provincial Chairman for ZANU-PF, in response to his calls for greater government accountability (Zimbabwe Independent Online, 1998a). Attempts to stifle opposition
by enacting a new constitution in March 2000 was defeated in a nationwide referendum. In spite of this, ZANU-PF and Mr. Mugabe remain firmly in control of the country and its institutions (Zimbabwe Press Mirror, 2000). From an economic standpoint, the collapse in incomes around the country render it more difficult for the population at large to secure adequate nutrition. Zimbabwe’s food surpluses therefore do not improve the welfare of its population.

Conclusion
The impact of economic adjustment in Zimbabwe and its effects on hunger allow us to draw several lessons. The Zimbabwean case is illustrative of a wide scale failure of entitlements under normal agro-climatic conditions and the absence of war. The case is also illustrative of the fact that entitlements analysis, originally conceptualised to study famines, is relevant to the analysis of endemic hunger. The Zimbabwean example strengthens the case for those who argue that increasing the supply of food to a population is insufficient to mitigate starvation. Increased supply needs to be matched by adequate means for the population to consume the produce. Empirically, endemic hunger within Zimbabwe results from the nature of production and political relationships within the country; an inequitable distribution of power and economic opportunities. In failing to reform the nature of these relationships, Zimbabwe has failed to create and protect basic entitlements that serve as the foundation for strong economies. Endemic hunger is a function of the misdistribution of economic resources and as long as it does not lead to widespread death there seems to be little incentive to eradicate it (Dreze & Sen, 1989). By neglecting the demand side of the equation government policy has failed to create a solid consumer class to sustain economic growth. The ESAP, which was conceived of as a vehicle for economic change, has turned sour. The harsh nature of these reforms have been compounded by political corruption. The absence of open government only encourages corruption because of a lack of checks on governmental authority. It also means that the system lacks legal mechanisms via which policy makers are sensitised to the needs and concerns of those most affected by policies. The government’s seeming apathy to the impact of a 30-40 per cent increase in the price of food during September 1998 and a 20 per cent increase in electricity tariffs during the same period are illustrative of that lack of sensitivity (Sunday Standard, 1998). The government’s treatment of its critics and its passivity in the face of worsening economic conditions call into question its commitment to improving the welfare of the governed. Under these circumstances the establishment of a pluralistic and transparent political system can only improve things.

Rupak Chattopadhyay, is in the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada, e-mail: rchattop@chass.utoronto.ca. I am grateful to Merle L Bowen and William G Martin for useful comments and advice.

Bibliographic Note


**Newspapers and other sources**


The Herald, 'Court orders State to assist in eviction of farm invaders', Friday, 14 April 2000.

Sunday Standard, 'Heavy price increases this week', September 27-3 October 1998.
