

In the United States of America, the mercenary agency work for Angola and Rhodesia was done mainly by one David Bufkin, a man involved with an illustrated publication devoted to promoting the myth of mercenarism and called 'Soldier of Fortune'. And the advertising for the agency work was done in that magazine as well as in newspapers and on television. Approved candidates were sent to Kinshasa, via Paris or Burssels, and under the tutelage of the Zaire embassy in Washington. At the same time, the F.B.I. had precise knowledge about this traffic in war prostitutes and did nothing to disturb it.

The defendants with American passports were thus contracted by Bufkin, for a monthly pay of 1200 dollars, tax-free and supplemented by various cash bonuses. They were quite conscious that they were coming to Angola to join the military forces of the F.N.L.A., whose design and venture was directed towards the sanguinary seizure of political power.

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### Neo-Colonial Manoeuvrings in Zimbabwe

The following extracts come from a document, a 'think piece', apparently commissioned by the British Foreign Office last year, which happened to come into our hands. The author, an independent analyst not, it seems, directly employed by the F.O., was asked:

*'What would be the most appropriate and acceptable form of peace-keeping force to minimise violence in Rhodesia during the transition to majority rule?'*

#### Possible Scenarios

##### *1. A sudden collapse of the white administration.*

In these circumstances the only kind of occasion for any form of external task force to become involved might be after a nationalist regime had assumed power. The only 'appropriate' function it might perform would be to assist in the evacuation of those whites who wished to leave the country or who had been declared undesirable. As most whites in Rhodesia have connections with South Africa and the United Kingdom, it would be logical that they should provide the administrative personnel and logistical back-up for such an operation.

##### *2. Variations on a negotiated transfer of power*

a. *External pressures on the nationalist politicians* applied perhaps by Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana or some of these, and on the Rhodesian administration (applied by South Africa) prove sufficient for compromise political settlement to emerge which might exclude the most militant nationalists who reject anything short of the immediate implementation of majority rule. Such a settlement might be on the basis of the alleged agreement between Zambia and South Africa in Lusaka during late 1974—a rapid sharing of power in government leading to political parity within a year or two and followed by a black parliamentary majority within a further two or three years. The fact that a section of the nationalists refuses to accept such an agreement leads to insurgency in outlying areas and

violent outbreaks occur between rival groups in the urban areas. . . if white Rhodesia (rather than submit to pressures for majority rule). . . chose to adopt a 'scorched earth' policy there is probably little that South Africa could do to prevent it. Although such an eventuality seems unlikely, the fact that government ministers have in the past hinted at this means that it cannot be totally ruled out. Similar reservations exist about whether the neighbouring black states would be willing to or capable of exerting effective pressure on the various nationalist groups. Zambia, for instance, is probably in a position to exercise considerable influence over the former ZAPU element of the reconstituted African National Council; whereas the ZANU element (for ethnic/geographical reasons) probably depends to a greater extent on support from Mozambique and Tanzania. This complicates the situation, since it might turn out that these countries found themselves ranged on different sides—the one perhaps supporting a negotiated settlement, while the other favoured a resumption of the fighting. In this situation the political problems associated with an 'acceptable' composition for a peace-keeping force would be almost insurmountable. However, the problem would be considerably eased if Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania were united in their approach and supported the same interests within Rhodesia with a view to securing a negotiated transition to majority rule. In this situation there would be two aspects to the task of peacekeeping: (i) the maintenance of security along Rhodesia's borders to prevent infiltration; (ii) the maintenance of security in Central urban areas where the white population is concentrated. In the case of (i), this might be achieved by Zambia, or joint Zambian/British?/New Zealand?/Australian?/(or even Rhodesian security force) patrolling along Rhodesia's north-western border; a Mozambique or joint Mozambican/Tanzanian?/New Zealand?/Australian?/Canadian? force along the north-eastern and eastern borders; and a South African/joint South African/British?/Botswana? force along the south and south-western borders. Internal security (ii) would depend largely on the degree of trust between the black and white element in a provisional administration during the transitional phase to a black parliamentary majority (or any other agreed definition of majority rule). If these relations were good, Rhodesian security forces (perhaps reorganised) might make a major contribution, although it is likely that there would also have to be some supervisory force (probably British) which was acceptable to both black and white elements in a provisional administration. The necessity for an emergency operation to evacuate whites would diminish if the transfer of power took place in an orderly manner. However, it is likely that there would still be a number who would wish to leave rather than accept black rule of any kind and it would be a sensible precaution if some arrangements for their assisted emigration were worked out in advance. . .

The nature and degree of support neighbouring black states might afford to the nationalists in Rhodesia would depend upon the state of inter-nationalist politics. The failure of the Rhodesian administration to negotiate a settlement with the nationalists could provide the opportunity for a temporary focus of unity as nationalist guerillas from all the groups reverted to armed resistance. Although there seems little doubt that Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique would support a

recourse to armed resistance on the part of the Zimbabwe nationalists if negotiations had proved abortive, they might still be prepared to encourage a recourse to negotiation if there was any indication of a change of heart in the white community. The dangers of an escalation of violence in Rhodesia for the neighbouring black states are real enough and to be avoided if at all possible. On the one hand, their support for an effective and united guerilla movement might invite retaliation by Rhodesia (this possibility has been talked about in Rhodesia in military circles); on the other, if divisions and conflicts between and within nationalist groups resurfaced (perhaps as a result of the failure to maintain the momentum of the armed struggle and to dislodge the administration in the urban and semi-urban areas) there is the possibility that such tribal and political rivalries could spill over into the domestic politics of neighbouring black states. President Kaunda's past and recent actions against unruly foreign nationalists illustrate his concern on this potential threat to Zambian security. Similarly, it was reliably reported that at the Lusaka talks in November 1974, Samora Machel, Mozambique's President-designate, took a serious view of this kind of problem. 'He also said that unity was the most important thing; he did not want any tribal split in Rhodesia because this would affect unity in Mozambique. He called the Shangaan Ndebele and said that a Shona-Ndebele division would have adverse effects on Mozambique because both Shona and Ndebele live across the border in Mozambique.' (From a confidential report by a senior nationalist participant who attended the Lusaka talks).

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(The document goes on to suggest two other variants of this scenario: a) 'coup' by the Rhodesian security chiefs, who 'become convinced that the situation cannot be militarily contained' (another example of prompting or wishful thinking perhaps?); b) stalemate between the guerillas occupying the rural areas and the white regime in the central/urban areas. In this latter case, 'all parties (including Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique) might have an interest in some degree of supervision during renewed negotiations. . . An 'appropriate' force under these conditions might be relatively large and have several roles to play'.)

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### *3. Inter-state confrontation or serious inter-communal violence.*

(In these circumstances, the paper argues, it would be impossible to raise a U.N. force, so. . .). The one and only possibility which could conceivably get around these difficulties would be intervention by British as the theoretically responsible colonial power, although there would have to be collaboration with other countries. . ., base facilities in Zambia and Mozambique, for example. However, given the UK's refusal to countenance the use of force in Rhodesia. . . it is difficult to envisage a reversal of this position at a time when British security forces are preoccupied by Northern Ireland and in the process of being subject to cuts in defence expenditure.

## Conclusion

The variables are so numerous and their interaction so complex that it is clearly not possible to anticipate with any degree of confidence the way in which the situation in Rhodesia will develop and plan accordingly. Nevertheless, the subject is extremely important. . . 'To be forewarned is to be forearmed'. . . The fact that a peace-keeping force (even the mere suggestion of the idea in certain circles) might prove counter-productive (by making white Rhodesians more intransigent on negotiations or by raising rather than reducing violence) ought also to be considered. . .

A number of points call out for consideration:

1. The *timing* of any operation is as important as the composition and function of the peace-keeping force. *Premature disclosure of such plans could prove harmful* to the purpose of reducing violence or preventing it and to the chance of promoting negotiated solutions.
2. This paper gives no detailed breakdown of the technical and logistical requirements in each different situation. This can only be done by someone with the professional competence and expertise which the author does not have.
3. The whole question of finance would also have to be analysed closely as would the question of which countries have the necessary degree of experience, trained manpower and equipment to make a relevant contribution to any peace-keeping operation (this would be quite apart from their political qualifications).
4. It would seem that any peace-keeping operation in Rhodesia would benefit from a plan worked out in advance for the assisted emigration of whites who might wish to leave or those who might be declared undesirables by any nationalist government, thereby removing potential sources of tension and facilitating the smoothest possible transition from white to majority rule.

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## Some Questions about the Chitepo Report and the Zimbabwe Movement

The Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into the Assassination of Herbert Chitepo in March 1975 was published in April this year. There are two basic findings:

- i. that he was killed by a bomb put in his car as part of a plot involving the whole of the then leadership of ZANU's army;
- ii. this and other killings were in turn a product of internal feuding that was entirely 'tribal' in origin.

Since then, the army commander Josiah Tongogara, provincial commander Joseph Chimurenga, and Chitepo's bodyguard have been charged with the murder and are on trial as we go to press. The findings of the Report have been used by some present factions as ammunition in the present power struggle; more sympathetic observers still, however, see it as confirmation of the factionalism and lack of commitment of ZANU and the Zimbabwe movement as a whole. It is worth offering a short critique of the Report, and the events from late 1974 on that it describes, for what might be learned about the movement, and the present prospects for the armed struggle