| | The prime concern by the Nigerian state in the management of the oil conflicts in the Niger Delta has been to maximise oil revenues. What is probably most confounding about this strategy is the evolving tendency to twist and treat every conflict in the Niger Delta, including some episodic 'epi-oil' conflicts abetted or orchestrated by the state itself, as oil conflicts. In other words, there is a tendency on the part of the state to wittingly 'oilify' some apparently extra-oil conflicts. Compared to other regimes before it, the present civilian administration has probably contributed most to the fast-tracking of this evolving phenomenon. This article unravels and analyses the evolving politics of oilification of extra-oil conflicts in the Niger Delta, its underlying rationale and consequences. Oilification, as the study demonstrates, is yet another in the series of dangerous contradictions engendered by the Nigerian state. How this and other dangerous contradictions could possibly be solved is a research conundrum for the relevant cognoscenti of state-society relations and conflicts in Nigeria. But would the Nigerian state take on board any useful and promising solutions materialising from such studies? This is most unlikely in the present conjuncture given the prevailing configuration of interests in the state. |
